October 20, 2004
CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS: CHEN'S 'CHARM OFFENSIVE'
IRKS PRC MEDIA
KEY FINDINGS
**
Dailies advise Beijing not to "turn a blind eye" to
President Chen's offer of dialogue.
**
Pro-PRC outlets call Chen's "devious" speech
"nothing other than world-play."
**
Critics say that the "main targets" of Chen's speech
were in the U.S., not Taiwan or China.
**
Chinese papers find military cooperation between the U.S. and
Taiwan "very worrisome."
MAJOR THEMES
A potential 'basis for cross-straits
talks'-- East Asian independent
outlets applauded Chen's "latest overtures" to restart negotiations
with the mainland. Taiwan's conservative
China Post likewise praised Chen's effort to "extend an olive
branch to rival Beijing." A few
observers downplayed Chen's "vague proposal" as "linguistic
gymnastics," but most agreed his "charm offensive" could be a
"good beginning" to create a "stable and constructive
cross-straits relationship" in light of the "growing tension between
China and Taiwan." Hong Kong's
mass-circulation Apple Daily urged Beijing to "grasp the
opportunity to start to talk to Chen," while the liberal Japan Times
concluded that "Beijing should reciprocate" Chen's offer.
Full of 'empty platitudes'--
Mainland
media blasted Chen's speech as "another sham" designed to lull China
while he "leads Taiwan to independence gradually." The official China Daily alleged that
the "slippery politician" Chen had "no sincerity in bettering ties
with the mainland," while Hong Kong's popular Sing Pao Daily saw
Chen "playing tricks with Beijing."
Pro-opposition outlets in Taiwan agreed that "there is no
breakthrough in sight" because Chen "circumscribed the fundamental
issue between China and Taiwan":
Beijing's insistence that there is only one China. Conservative United Daily News
concluded that Chen's speech was neither "credible nor feasible"
'Merely for show to please the U.S.'-- Chen critics said that the speech merely sought
to give the world, especially the U.S., the "impression that Taiwan--not
Beijing--wants peace." Conservative
Hong Kong Economic Times also advised Beijing not to take Chen "too
seriously," because the speech "was merely a show for U.S. President
Bush." Another observer in Hong
Kong noted that Washington "noticed Chen's goodwill." Though pro-Chen writers in Taiwan stressed
that the speech "earned domestic and international praise,"
pro-opposition papers dismissed it as an "attempt to curry favor with the
U.S." One went so far as to suggest
the "move was made at the request of the U.S." to stabilize the
cross-straits situation.
'A certain country is conniving in Taiwan's war
preparations'-- Another prominent theme
in Chinese dailies was concern over U.S. assistance to Taiwan's "urgent
expansion of military preparations."
Following a Taiwanese official's "talk of firing missiles at
Shanghai" in case of a conflict, official Global Times alleged the
U.S. has "emboldened the Taiwan authorities to develop offensive military
strength." International Herald
Leader warned the U.S. that its military aid to Taiwan would prove
"harmful for U.S.-China relations"; other writers also criticized
Taiwan's "controversial" $18 million arms purchase from the U.S.
Prepared by Media Reaction Branch (202)
203-7888, rmrmail@state.gov
EDITOR: Ben Goldberg
EDITOR'S NOTE: Media
Reaction reporting conveys the spectrum of foreign press sentiment. Posts select commentary to provide a
representative picture of local editorial opinion. Some commentary is taken directly from the
Internet. This report summarizes and
interprets foreign editorial opinion and does not necessarily reflect the views
of the U.S. Government. This analysis
was based on 35 reports from 9 political entities over 11 - 19 October 2004. Editorial excerpts are listed from the most
recent date.
EAST ASIA
CHINA: "Taiwan
Secretly Assists The U.S. To Deploy At Shimoji Island"
Wang Haifeng commented in official international Global Times
(Huanqiu Shibao) (10/18): “The
surprising inside story of Taiwan arms purchases was recently exposed. A large part of the Taiwan authorities’ 610.8
billion-yuan arms purchase budget is not for arms, but for secretly assisting
the U.S. military to deploy at Shimoji Island.
The U.S. favors the small Shimoji Island...because it has a special
strategic geographical position.... It
is located close to Taiwan...and the U.S. could enhance its connections with
its bases in East Asia and increase its dominance of strategic southern waterways. The Taiwan authorities are so rushed to
assist the U.S. military to deploy at Shimoji Island because it just wants to
use the U.S. to embolden ‘Taiwan independence’ followers.... Taiwan provides money to help the U.S. set up
military bases to fight against its own compatriots, and its nature is not just
to please the U.S.... This has aroused
severe reactions among the island’s people and insightful people.... Meanwhile the increase in U.S.-Taiwan
military exchanges is very worrisome."
"U.S. Temporarily Ceases HARM Sales To
Taiwan: A Direct Threat To China’s
Coastal Radar"
Li Runtian wrote in official International
Herald Leader (Guoji Xianqu Daobao) (10/14): “U.S. officials openly denied the news in the
Washington Post that the U.S. Defense Department agreed to sell Taiwan
High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM)....
The paper reported that...it is believed that the relevant decisions
will be made after the Presidential election, and the possibility of agreeing
to sell HARM to Taiwan will be ‘relatively higher.’ Experts think that the U.S. Defense
Department’s behavior is undoubtedly another breakthrough after the U.S. sold
submarines to Taiwan. It traces an
increasingly obvious U.S. inclination in regard to the Taiwan Straits
issue. It is harmful for U.S.-China
relations and the cross-Straits situation....
Complex political factors are behind the U.S.' ambiguous attitude and
vague words.... First, the U.S. wants to
make use of this arms purchase to force the Taiwan authorities to enhance the
promotion of the 610.8 billion yuan arms purchase.... Second, the U.S. Presidential election glows
brightly.... The U.S. is cautious about
dealing with this sensitive issue at this time.... Third, the arms purchase indeed violated many
rules governing U.S.-China relations....
The U.S. has to worry about the social response, international influence
and its influence on overall U.S.-China relations.”
"Chen Needs More Sincerity To Solve
Issues"
Hai Xia held in the official English-language China
Daily (10/14): “The peace overture
in Chen Shui-bian's 'Double Ten National Day' speech turned out to be another
sham. One of Chen's major announcements,
which was considered to be something new in his speech, was his call for Taiwan
and the mainland to use the 1992 Hong Kong Meeting as a basis to seek 'not
necessarily perfect but acceptable schemes' for furthering cross-Straits
talks. This has therefore been viewed by
some as an olive branch by Chen.
Nevertheless, Chen's suggestion to base future cross-Straits talks on
the 1992 meeting was nothing more than word-play.... Chen's other major declaration in his October
10 speech that 'the Republic of China (ROC) is Taiwan, and Taiwan is ROC'
further mirrors his baseline of 'Taiwan's independence.' Many wonder whether Taiwan's audience was the
main target of Chen's speech. His latest
address was once again decorated with empty platitudes.... Chen knows the value of overseas sympathy in
his attempts to internationalize his case. He also knows there is no legal grounds
for his independence pursuit under the framework of current international law
and norms. No valid international law
can lend legitimacy to his fantasy of defining Taiwan as a sovereign state
independent of China. What most of the
overseas audience heard, however, were the very latest, and the most beguiling
words of a slippery politician.”
"Chen's Appeal For Talks Nothing But Word Games"
The official English-language China Daily declared
(10/13): "Taiwan leader Chen
Shui-bian's suggestion to base future cross-Straits talks on the results of the
1992 Meeting was nothing other than word-play as well as a gesture that aimed
to create the illusion that a renewed dialogue was still possible.... Several days before delivering his speech on
October 10, Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian invited world attention over his
speech which, he hinted, would have positive and constructive implications on
and contributions towards the improvement of cross-Straits relations and
Sino-US ties as well as world peace. One
of Chen's major announcements, which was considered to be something new in his
speech, was his suggestion for Taiwan and the mainland to use the 1992 Hong
Kong Meeting as a basis to map out a 'less-than-perfect but acceptable plan' as
a preparation for further consultation and talks. As we all know, the mainland has hoped that
the island administration's stance could return to the 1992 Consensus so that
negotiations could resume. Chen's promise
to base future talks on the 1992 Meeting has, therefore, given some people
hope, and some pundits feel that Chen has at least created some leeway in a
relatively ambiguous way. The crucial
question is whether Chen's proposal means he is really willing to return to the
1992 Consensus.... The answer is
negative.... The Chen
administration...has ignored historical facts and consistently denied the
existence of the 1992 Consensus.... In
his speech on October 10, 2000, Chen proposed to use the '1992 Spirit' as the
basis for resumption of talks with the mainland, a suggestion that was
naturally rejected by Beijing. Mainstream opinion on the island and those of
insight pointed out at that time that Chen was playing with words in order to
neutralize the 1992 Consensus and avoid the 'one China' principle, an
indication that he had no sincerity in bettering ties with the
mainland.... All these points foretell
that the possibility of a breakthrough in their cause of Taiwan independence
has become increasingly high."
"Taiwan’s Smuggled Weapons Intercepted: Severe Strike To Taiwan Military’s Plan To
Develop Counter-Strike Weapons"
Li Runtian commented in official international Global
Times (Huanqiu Shibao) (10/13):
“Not long before was a weapons smuggling activity of the Taiwan
authorities resolved. Its secret plan to
import assault weapons to the Island has been revealed and this has greatly
disturbed Chen Shui-bian’s military independence plan. Taiwan’s ‘military bureau,’ through a
European company that it dominates by the name of ‘European Manufacturers,’
made contact with American arms sellers....
The U.S. side finally agreed to do business by ‘mistakenly thinking’ the
products wouldn’t enter Taiwan....
Although the smuggling activity ended in failure, Taiwan’s ‘plan to
develop counter-strike weapons that could reach Shanghai’ and thus the true
face of its urgent expansion of military preparations was exposed
completely. The Taiwan authorities tried
to smuggle offensive weapons in such an insane manner mainly because its
military’s war preparations are so enormous that Taiwan’s production
capabilities can not satisfy its needs....
Analysts think that for a certain long period of time into the future,
the Taiwan authorities will still drain their efforts to conduct ammunition
smuggling activities. The international
community should be vigilant. Meanwhile,
people should also pay attention to the issue that a certain country is
conniving in Taiwan’s war preparations in secret. These countries call for prevention of arms
proliferation, but offer connivance and support to the Taiwan military’s
activities. This has emboldened the
Taiwan authorities to develop offensive military strength.”
"Taiwan Promotes Separation During
Holiday: Claiming ‘Goodwill Gesture’,
But Still Promoting 'Taiwan Independence'"
Wu Wei and Yu Yang said in official
international Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao) (10/11): "Chen Shuibian has racked his brains
with schemes to make use of the ‘October 10’ holiday.... Chen’s speech that day can be summed up in
two sentences: both sides of the Straits want peace, and the Island wants
stability.... But obviously the Chen
Shuibian authorities have done nothing regarding either thing. His speech was trying to fake harmonious stability
and cheating the public.... Although
superficially Chen did not talk about ‘Taiwan independence’ in his speech, he
is speaking the language of ‘independence’ between the words.' From arms purchases to the ‘October 10
holiday’ the Taiwan authorities’ steps toward ‘independence’ have
intensified. Analysts think this relates
to the U.S. Chen’s think-tank predicts
that the US will adopt a ‘suppressive’ policy toward Taiwan from the U.S.
Presidential election in November to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Conference next March. Thus before this
period, the Taiwan authorities will step up promoting ‘independence’ to reap
benefits and to provoke conflicts between the U.S. and the Mainland.... Chen will continue to promote ‘Taiwan
independence without mentioning Taiwan independence'.... ‘Progressive Taiwan independence’ is more
devious and merits a higher level of attention.”
CHINA (HONG KONG AND MACAU SARS): "Olive Branch Must Be Backed By
Action"
The independent English-language South China Morning Post
opined (10/11): "If Taiwanese
President Chen Shui-bian is sincere, it could just be the linguistic gymnastics
that will get talks with the mainland back on track. There are reasons to be skeptical of Mr
Chen's vague proposal, which needs to be followed up quickly with details and
other shows of sincerity. But as far as olive branches go, Mr. Chen's address
yesterday provided a firmer basis for discussion than his inaugural speech in
May. Despite the possibility that Mr. Chen's speech was pure politicking, the
latest overtures should not be rejected out of hand. They offer a chance to
alter the existing course of cross-strait relations, which is characterized by
growing economic interdependence but a growing likelihood of military
confrontation. Judging from the hardline
comments coming from Beijing in recent months, most recently in reaction to
Taiwan's proposal to buy US$18 billion worth of advanced weapons systems from
the U.S., it is not clear that the mainland will be sympathetic.... At the least, (Chen's) proposal for talks on
direct air links should be taken up immediately by both sides. The mainland has
already said that no agreement on the one China principle needs to be in place
before such talks can progress. Now that Mr. Chen is signaling the Taiwan
side's willingness, and given that the demand for such services is
well-established, there is no reason to stall on this front. In shaping the basis for renewed talks,
imperfect but acceptable is a standard well worth striving for, especially if
the alternative is continued drift towards a regionally destabilising
confrontation."
"Bian Puts On A Show; Hard To Cool Cross-straits
Temperatures"
Independent Chinese-language Ming Pao contended
(10/12): "The intention behind Chen
Shui-bian's speech yesterday appeared good, but Chen insists on defining the
cross-straits relationship as between 'Taiwan and China.' This cannot elicit a positive response from
Beijing. This time, Chen Shui-bian again
put the ball back in Beijing's court, leaving the international community with
the impression that Taiwan--not Beijing--wants peace across the Taiwan
Straits. If Taiwan indeed wants
long-lasting peace, it would be easy to achieve: All it will take is Chen Shui-bian's
admission that, per the 1992 Hong Kong agreements, there is only one
China. But Chen is determined to promote
Taiwanese independence, and he will not compromise.... (His speech) was merely for show to please
the U.S."
"Bian Changes Stance To Cater To Bush"
Conservative Chinese-language Hong Kong Economic Times
stated (10/12): "Chen Shui-bian's
Double Ten (October 10) speech was neither sincere nor a signal to slow down
the process of Taiwan independence. It
was merely a show for U.S. President Bush...who wants Taiwan to maintain the
status quo, neither independent nor part of China. If Taiwan speeds up its drive for
independence and incite Beijing to start a war, the U.S. would be faced with
the dilemma of whether to send troops across the Taiwan Straits. Moreover, to attract Beijing's support in the
upcoming U.S. election, Bush must have to ask Bian to behave.... It is believed that Beijing will not take
Bian's words too seriously. To prevent
Taiwanese independence, Beijing mainly depends on the Taiwanese people and the
United States, with the latter playing a bigger role. Regardless of whether Bush or Kerry wins the
U.S. election, it is critical for Beijing to win support from the U.S.
government to stop Chen Shui-bian from leading Taiwan to independence."
"Bian Not Credible; Taiwan's Drive For Independence
Unchanged"
Independent, pro-free trade Chinese-language Hong Kong Economic
Journal remarked (10/12):
"Although the U.S. State Department. praised Bian's new words on
cross-straits relations as being 'constructive,' the Taiwanese leader is not
accountable, based on his past behavior and political record.... It is very clear that Chen is determined to
lead Taiwan to independence gradually.
As long as the current stability and peace across the Taiwan Straits can
be maintained, Beijing won't take Taiwan by force. On the other hand, the U.S. won't abandon
military support to Taiwan. Chen can thus implement a series of anti-China
actions to instill the concept of Taiwanese independence. Once the support for this idea becomes the
main trend, it will be very difficult for Beijing to take Taiwan by
force."
"Grasp Every Opportunity To Promote Cross-straits Talk"
Mass-circulation Chinese-language Apple Daily held
(10/12): "Beijing should grasp the
opportunity to start to talk to Chen Shui-bian after his Double Ten
speech. Although Bian's move was the
result of pressure from the U.S., we believe, at least, that Mr. Chen has
realized that he has to establish a kind of stable political relationship with
Beijing. And, Beijing should not turn a blind eye to him, as long as Mr. Chen
is willing to talk with some kind of sincerity."
"Why Not Just Say It--If Chen Really Supports One China"
Chinese-language center-left Sing Tao Daily editorialized
(10/12): "Chen Shui-bian's new
proposal was vague. It was packaged to
win support from the U.S. and Taiwanese voters for the election by the end of
the year. Chen's speech technically
avoided touching the sensitive issue of 'One-China.' His target audiences were the American and
Taiwanese voters, not Beijing."
"Why Didn't Chen Shui-bian Mention The '92 Agreement?"
Chinese-language popular Sing Pao Daily observed
(10/12): "Bian was playing tricks
with Beijing in his Double Ten (October 10) speech. As the U.S. presidential election campaign is
gearing up, Bush is trying to realize US$18 billion worth of weapon sales to
Taiwan to show his political merits to the American voters. At the same time, Chen Shui-bian would have
to grasp every opportunity to convince Taiwan people that the biggest threat
they are facing is from the mainland, and Taiwan must buy military security
from the United States. With such an
attitude, how can he make Beijing accept his 'sincerity'?"
TAIWAN: "What Have the
National Day Fireworks Lit Up?"
Conservative, pro-unification United Daily
News editorialized (10/18):
"President Chen's National Day speech seems to have been related to
the U.S. in many ways. First, in the
beginning, rumors had it that the draft of Chen's speech had been reviewed by
Washington before it was delivered; then both Washington and Tokyo responded to
Chen's speech immediately, evidently indicating that they were both prepared to
do so. Then when his speech failed to
get the response from Beijing that was expected, President Chen went so far as
to say that 'Washington had told me that Beijing would respond to it this
way.' All these signs have made people
wonder if Chen's cross-Strait talk was made at the request of the U.S. Some other people also have speculated that
Chen was trying to use this speech to alleviate cross-Strait tensions in an
attempt to curry favor with the U.S....
In April, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly did not mind taking
all the trouble of writing five paragraphs to elaborate on how both sides of
the Taiwan Strait reached a consensus in the 1992 meeting about different
interpretations by either side of the 'one China' principle, which also led to
the Koo-Wang meetings in 1993 and 1998, respectively.... Such a move shows that Chen referred to the
'1992 Hong Kong meeting' in his National Day address because the U.S.
government was his planned target audience and that such a move was made at the
request of the U.S.... In Washington's
eyes, the '1992 Hong Kong meeting' that Chen mentioned in his speech may sound
equal to the '1992 consensus' that Washington hoped he would say. But Washington probably has failed to notice
the difference between the two terms, or maybe it did not find out that Chen
was 'playing with words' until now. As a
result, if the National Day speech was a gift by President Chen to the U.S.,
what could Washington be feeling now--surprise at receiving a gift, or
embarrassment at being made fun of for having complimented Chen on the 'constructive'
message of his speech?"
"Incrementalism Or Obstructionism"
The pro-independence, English-language Taiwan
News commented (10/18): "By
issuing another expression of goodwill to the other side, President Chen earned
domestic and international praise. The
first and direct benefit will be felt in the DPP's legislative election
campaign, thanks to its rising capability to build up an image of a moderate
and progressive governing force in Taiwan that can secure wider support from
middle of the road voters. Even without
a positive response from Beijing, Chen and his party has skillfully drawn
support from both domestic and external audiences and affirmation on both
fronts will in turn be helpful to the DPP's campaign.... In either case, the key priority for Taiwan's
leadership is to minimize the chance of any severe crises or military
confrontations [across the Taiwan Strait].
International influence, particularly from the U.S. and Japan and other
great powers, should play a more significant role in both mediation and
monitoring the maintenance of peace. A
framework of peace is essentially needed to craft a stable and constructive
cross-strait relationship. Only through
talks and exchanges of different views can a predictable and institutionalized
framework for cross-strait interaction be advanced."
"Can Chen's Gesture Be Turned Into Real
Policy?"
Ku Er-teh noted in the pro-independence,
English-language Taipei Times (10/18):
"Chen certainly shoed goodwill in his [National Day] address,
although to what degree he was sincere is a little more difficult to
fathom. Can this goodwill be translated
into actual policy? Some would say the
most important thing is how the Chinese will respond to it, but even more
important is whether or not Chen's team prepare their own contingency plan
prior to implementing any such policy.
It turns out that the Executive Yuan, the Ministry of National Defense,
and even the Presidential Office had no idea what Chen was going to say in his
address. Based on this, it seems that
his words were simply intended to communicate his good intentions, but for what
purpose? I'm afraid that the
consequences of Chen's words might not have been thought through. But at least the Americans noticed Chen's
goodwill."
"A High-profile Olive Branch, Short Of A
Vital Incentive"
The conservative, English-language China Post
maintained (10/14): "Few would
disagree that President Chen Shui-bian is No. 1 when it comes to making issues.
With the crucial legislative election less than two months away, the president
on Sunday used the National Day occasion to extend an olive branch to rival
Beijing by proposing the resumption of talks, a topic which can always provoke
wide public attention. Chen...suggested
that the two sides use the '1992 meeting in Hong Kong as the basis' for the
restart of dialogue and consultation. He
proposed discussing a number of important measures to reduce tension and
hostility between Taiwan and the mainland....
Unsurprisingly, his talk immediately earned him a great deal of
publicity as his National Day speech grabbed front-page headlines.... Chen's cross-strait relations talks also won
acclaim from the international community. The U.S. State Department welcomed
Chen's address.... Taipei's wish may
prove to be unrealistic. By invoking the 1992 meeting, Chen clearly hoped that
the two sides will follow that model and put aside thorny sovereignty
disputes.... But Chen intentionally
ignored a more fundamental part of that meeting. Taipei and Beijing delegations
to the Hong Kong discussions at the time reached a crucial tacit consensus on
the issue of national identity. That is, Taipei and Beijing, although
disagreeing with each other over the meaning of 'one China,' both insist on the
'one China' principle. It was this
landmark bilateral consensus that had made it possible for the two rivals to
launch semi-official contacts.... That
Chen deliberately ignored this essential part of the Hong Kong meeting was
obviously because he wanted to dodge the 'one China' issue.... But that is a matter Beijing cares about
most. It insists that Chen must first accept the 'one China' principle before
any cross-strait talks can be held. So
it would not be surprising if Beijing responds negatively to Chen's call for
talks.... But even so, Chen still could
come out of the latest bilateral encounter on the air as the winner. First, a persistent reluctance to talk with
Taipei would make Beijing appear as intransigent.... On the other hand, if Chen should fail to get
Beijing to the negotiating table he would still succeed in achieving the
publicity for his renewed efforts to reduce hostilities across the Taiwan
Strait."
"The One China Myth Is The Source of
Sadness For The Taiwan People"
Pro-independence Liberty Times asserted
(10/14): "Today, China has made it
very clear that only by sticking to the one China principle can both sides
resume talks. The one China principle is
a synonym for 'annexing Taiwan.'
Therefore the Pan-Blue politicians in Taiwan should cut off their links
with the one-China principle, identify with Taiwan and accept democracy, or
they will only bring Taiwan towards the tragic ending of war. Taiwan's elected leader should also stop
wasting his effort in dealing with China meaninglessly. The only right way is to assert Taiwan's
identity and seek a way out for the 23 million people."
"Clinging To The Wrong Phrase"
Lee Fu-cheng held in the pro-independence,
English-language Taipei Times (10/14):
"Since former president Lee Teng-hui declared his 'special
state-to-state' policy in 1999, no matter under which political regime, the
people of Taiwan in principle have not recognized the '1992 consensus,' where
both sides of the Taiwan Strait agreed on as much as they could on the formula
of 'one China, with each side having its own interpretation'.... Contextually speaking the stance of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is firm that both sides of the Taiwan Strait
have never come to terms with 'one China'....
The Chinese, however, cling to the phrase 'one China' and generally
ignore all other ambiguities.... China's
uncompromising stance on its international affairs is obvious to all; it
believes that the government of the PRC is the sole government representing
China, and no other interpretation by Taiwan is allowed.... Beijing has for years insisted that a
cross-strait agreement on the meaning of "one China" was reached at
the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong; in other words, China is accusing Taiwan of
refusing to admit that it has changed its mind.... In fact, the meeting's main purpose was to
reach agreements on the issues of cross-strait certified mail and professional
certification.... Chen, in his Double
Ten National Day speech, mentioned his willingness to 'use the basis of the
1992 meeting in Hong Kong' to reopen a channel for a cross-strait
dialogue.... Whether Beijing will decide
to respond to Chen's speech may be a crucial factor shaping cross-strait
relations. If China responds by expressing its good will, formal talks between
the DPP government and China will be feasible.
On the contrary, if Beijing continues its indifferent attitude, Chen's
China policies during his next four years of administration will be
futile."
"Chen Uses The U.S."
Lo Chia-wei maintained in conservative,
pro-unification United Daily News (10/14): "President Chen, in response to China's
Taiwan Affairs Office's remarks, said 'the U.S. has told us to be
patient.' Chen's words have offered a
good beginning for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to 'put aside their
disputes.' There may be a chance for
improvements in the cross-Strait situation next spring if Taiwan's goodwill
gestures can last beyond the legislative elections and Beijing can act in a
softer manner."
"To Concentrate Taiwan People's 'General
Will.'"
DPP Legislator Shen Fu-hsiung opined in
centrist, pro-status quo China Times (10/14): "It is not unexpected that China's
Taiwan Affairs Office would harshly criticize President Chen's National Day
speech. On the surface, it seems that
negotiations and reconciliation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are
in the indefinite future. But for
Taiwan, now is the best chance for us to work out a consensus among
ourselves.... Even though Chen's speech
has failed to win a goodwill response from Beijing, it still has indicative
significance in coordinating the disputes inside Taiwan regarding unification
and independence. The president has
maximized the possible forms for the future development of cross-Strait
relations--namely, except for Taiwan independence, there are other options like
forming a federation, confederation, commonwealth, or even a unified one-China
framework. All of these can cover the
majority views held by the Taiwan people.
Chen's move proves that he has broken the blockade of the
fundamentalists regarding cross-Strait issues and has returned to the pragmatic
central route."
"Taiwan, Mainland On A Collision
Course"
The conservative, pro-unification,
English-language China Post contended (10/14): "By offering to use the 1992 meeting
instead of the 1992 consensus as the model for resumed talks, President Chen
was in fact denying there was such a consensus.
The 'one China principle,' which implies that both Taiwan and the
mainland are apart of China, was the basis for cross-Strait talks. The Chen administration has been unwilling to
acknowledge that there was any such consensus because it runs counter to the
ruling party's pro-independence stance.
The present predicament makes the prospects for cross-strait peace
rather dim. The ruling DPP and its
allies are determined to bring Taiwan independence to reality. Even some political opponents of the 'green'
camp, believing that this can win them more grassroot support, tend to support
the independence campaign. The trend is
putting Taiwan and the mainland on a collision course. Beijing will by no means tolerate the
declaration of statehood by the Taipei government. It will do everything possible, including the
use of military force, to thwart the movement of Taiwan toward
independence. Tension in the Taiwan
Strait will in all likelihood rise further as the independence advocates
aggressively push for the accomplishment of their goal and the Beijing government
make intense efforts to stop them. The
future of Taiwan has become highly unpredictable, with the possibility of the
outbreak of war growing steadily."
"China's Taiwan Affairs Office Fails To
Accommodate President Chen Shui-bian's Soft Landing"
Conservative, pro-unification United Daily
News declared (10/14): "Judged
from various angles, the statements issued by China's Taiwan Affairs Office's
Wednesday were already tantamount to a political showdown. Beijing seems to say that unless President
Chen acknowledges the 'one China' principle and thus establishes a political
premise, it would be meaningless to discuss any future issues concerning both
sides, including the three links, direct charter flights and other interactions
across the Taiwan Strait--meaning that the door would be closed for any
cross-Strait discussions. President
Chen's reference to the '1992 Hong Kong meeting as the basis' [for re-opening
cross-Strait talks] shows that he is also clearly aware that the '1992
consensus' is the key to resuming cross-Strait interaction and that he hopes
Beijing could accept his 'synonym' to improve on the impasse caused by 'one
China.' But Beijing has refused to
accept Chen's attempt to use '1992 Hong Kong meeting' to replace the '1992
consensus' in exchange for a 'soft landing.'
Beijing even made a tighter definition [of the '1992 meeting'] and
directly called Chen 'deceptive.' For
Beijing, the three direct links and charter flights are no longer its
priorities now, and the 'one China' has become a political premise that allows
no [other]."
"Practical Solutions The Best Option"
Chen Mu-min wrote in the English-language
pro-independence Taipei Times (10/13):
"Recent controversies over Premier Yu Shyi-kun's use of the phrase
'balance of terror' to counter China's military threats...have stirred much
criticism.... The more rudimentary
cause...is Taiwan's inability to change the status quo under China's long-term
suppression. Strictly speaking, the
government has exerted its utmost effort in grappling with foreign relations,
and its main purpose is to ensure Taiwan's self-awareness in the hope that
China and the international community will eventually recognize Taiwan's
existence. The greatest risk in this
strategy is that, given the difficulties in making Taiwan's voice heard in
China and the international society, Taiwan itself is held responsible for the
consequences of provoking cross-strait tension.... From a military point of view, cross-strait
relations currently are obviously tenser than four years ago.... Struggling for survival under the shadow of
China is Taiwan's fate. Expanding cross-strait economic relations in recent
years has not alleviated cross-strait hostility. On the contrary it has made
them worse. Without basic mutual trust
between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, many cross-strait policy makers'
predict that a cross-strait war will eventually take place. Along with increased military
deployments--both qualitatively and quantitatively--and rising Chinese
nationalism, a cross-strait war becomes increasingly likely.... Our efforts have not gained much recognition
in the international community.... The
collision between Taiwan's insistence on maintaining its self-awareness and the
international reality has resulted in the gradual depletion of political and
economic resources.... Viewed from
Taiwan's perspective, there are three possible directions in which cross-strait
relations can develop. First, Chinese
leaders may gradually begin to feel that long-term suppression can't solve
cross-strait tension.... Second, the
cross-strait enmity is becoming more intense as the arms race escalates.
Chinese leaders, under great internal pressure, could decide to use military
power to solve the Taiwan issue.... The
third and most likely scenario is that China continues to suppress
Taiwan.... The biggest challenge to the
current leaders in Taiwan is how to construct a new strategic plan to
peacefully coexist with China without giving up Taiwan's self-awareness. Since Taiwan does not have enough strength to
fight China, stubbornly advocating policies to counterattack China not only
fails to win international support, but also runs counter to the mainstream
international idea of engaging with China in order to change its regime
fundamentally. Taking care of Taiwan's
self awareness while coexisting with China is the only way to resolve Taiwan's
diplomatic and military dilemma."
"President Chen's National Day Address"
The conservative pro-unification English-language China Post
editorialized (10/12): "President
Chen Shui-bian was his usual self as he addressed the nation on Double Ten Day
yesterday. Despite hints that he would broach a breakthrough in Taipei-Beijing
relations, the president circumscribed the fundamental issue between Taiwan and
China again, mouthing only he would now accept what has come to be known as
'the consensus of 1992.' The unsigned
agreement, which paved the way for two top proxies of Taipei and Beijing to
meet in Singapore a year later, is part of the sine qua non China has set to
start dialogue with Taiwan. The other part, practically the only bone of
contention, is for Taipei to accept the 'one China' principle. Chen made no
mention of that principle. As a result,
whatever else the president said in his address means nothing to Chinese
leaders who at one time seemed eager to resume the dialogue suspended a couple
of years before Chen was first elected in 2000.... There is no breakthrough in sight. And the
president, a master of hocus-pocus, referred to the tacit agreement not as the
commonly accepted consensus of 1992 but 'the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong
Kong'.... But none would be possible
without Beijing assured first that he honestly accepts the 'one China'
principle. Of course, he is not going to give the Chinese that assurance. And
that's that. As a matter of fact, the
president's National Day address had only one aim to attain. It is a pep talk
to get his Democratic Progressive Party to win a parliamentary majority in the
Legislative Yuan election scheduled for December 11."
"A Basis For Talks"
Centrist, pro-status quo China Times maintained
(10/11): "The speech could in
theory serve as a basis for cross-strait talks.... But if Beijing still insists that Taipei must
first of all 'recognise the one-China policy'...and sees the above as a
'pre-condition' for resuming cross-strait talks, then there will probably be no
breakthrough."
"Lack Of Trust"
Conservative, pro-unification United Daily
News asked (10/11): "Does
President Chen have enough personal credibility to make his cross-strait
remarks credible and feasible?"
"Dialogue Effort"
Pro-independence Taiwan Daily commented
(10/11): "The president's speech
showed a desire for peace and reconciliation.... The speech...deserves to be carefully
considered and valued by the leaders of the other side."
JAPAN:
"China-Taiwan Dialogue:
Hoping For A Broader Viewpoint From China"
Conservative Sankei held (10/18): "Not just China and Taiwan, but also the
U.S. and Japan, are actively involved in proposals and bargaining regarding the
resumption of dialogue between China and Taiwan following a five-year period of
no contact. We urge both sides to embark
on the path of reopening dialogue...in order to improve the entire region's
security, stability and prosperity in the coming years. This latest move began when Taiwan President
Chen Shui-bian...again called upon China to reopen dialogue. President Chen...offered preparations to
resume dialogue. In response, China on
Oct. 13th...rejected the offer, saying in bilateral talks with Japan that the
proposal had zero value.... Since
President Chen took office in 2000, he has repeatedly called for dialogue, but
the Chinese side, viewing Chen as a member of the pro-independence faction, has
rejected every offer until and unless Chen accepts the precondition that there
is only one China. During the age when
the ruling Kuomindang party embraced the fiction that all China, including the
mainland, was part of the Chinese republic, both sides were able to accept
differing definitions of 'one China,' but since the election of former
President Lee Teng-hui, who tossed out that fiction, it is very difficult to
accept unconditionally that definition.
Also, it is almost impossible for Chen, whose Democratic Party defeated
the Kuomindang, to accept that condition, and over 80 percent of Taiwanese
oppose China's newest offer to allow Taiwan to unify with China under the 'one
country, two systems' framework. As long
as Taiwan is a democracy, the fact is that no president can dictatorially
accept a 'one China' condition. As far
as President Chen's offer is concerned, both the U.S. and Japan welcomed it in
an unprecedented manner.... It also
cannot be denied that Chen might have thought to bolster his party's chances in
the upcoming end-of-year legislative elections.
However, any dialogue between the two sides would...improve peace and
security in the Taiwan Straits.... China
should make a decision based on a larger-scale, less narrow-minded
viewpoint."
"A Peace Overture From Taiwan"
The liberal English-language Japan Times
editorialized (10/14): "Taiwanese
President Chen Shui-bian last weekend bid to improve relations with
China.... Chen called on Beijing to
resume long-stalled talks and help build confidence and lower tension across
the Taiwan Strait. Critically, he seems willing to resume talks on the basis of
the 'one China' principle, which has been the foundation of Beijing's approach
to Taiwan. Suspicions toward Mr. Chen persist in China, but the best way to
address them is to test the president to see whether he is, in fact, willing to
build a bridge across the troubled strait. China is unlikely to make that
move. Relations between Beijing and
Taipei have been especially contentious since Mr. Chen took office in
2000.... The new president touted a
Taiwanese national identity and worked to win more international recognition
for Taiwan. China continued to insist
that any discussions with Taiwan could begin only when Taipei accepted the 'one
China' principle.... Chen refused and
the stalemate endured.... Cognizant of
the rising tensions in the strait and under increasing pressure from other
governments that believe Mr. Chen deserves much of the blame for the worsening
situation, the president in his National Day speech said he was willing to
resume discussions on the basis of the 1992 'one China' agreement.... Chen's willingness to return to the 1992
fudge is to be applauded, although Beijing is unlikely to reciprocate--at least
not yet.... In the zero-sum calculus
that rules cross-strait relations, Mr. Chen's speech seems to signal that he is
on the defensive. So, rather than encourage compromise, Beijing may demand
more. That would be a mistake. Mr.
Chen's political position is the result of important changes within Taiwan. He
represents the rising aspirations of an indigenous Taiwanese political
identity.... The smart policy is not to
try to wait out Mr. Chen--since Taiwanese sentiment is only growing--but to
co-opt his supporters. Beijing must try to win the hearts and minds of the
Taiwanese people. A political dialogue with Taipei would be an important step
in that process. Mr. Chen has offered the mainland a way to begin those talks;
Beijing should reciprocate."
EUROPE
BRITAIN: "Taiwan’s
Peace Offer Should Not Be Lightly Dismissed"
An editorial in the independent Financial Times read
(10/12): "[B]oth sides must work
hard if Mr. Chen’s charm offensive is to produce results. Mr. Chen needs to rein in his advisers,
ministers and supporters and stop them making provocative comments that assert
Taiwanese independence or are hostile to Beijing. Chinese leaders, on the other hand, need to
accept that the democratically elected Mr. Chen has limited room for
manoeuvre. Supporters of independence
have already started to accuse him of betraying his principles.”
FRANCE: "France’s
Chinese Contradictions"
Jean-Pierre Cabestan wrote in right-of-center Le Figaro
(10/13): “In spite of comments about
Cirac’s successful trip to China, we must wonder about the incoherence of our
Chinese policy.... One contradiction
lies in Chirac’s desire to lift the arms embargo, while he does not see the
relationship between the embargo and the growing tension between China and
Taiwan.... It is because of this tension
that Washington instituted the embargo...and re-enforced its military
commitment to Taiwan. Under these circumstances, can France and Europe lift the
embargo without once again endangering the transatlantic relationship? Should
Europe bury its head in the sand when it comes to the tension in this region?
Such an attitude would put Europe’s military industry in a difficult position
because of its close relationship with America’s military industry, which is
both a competitor and a partner. It is to China’s advantage to play the U.S.
and Europe against each other. But must Europe, and France, play into China’s
hands? On the contrary we must play up the West’s unity...in order to ease
military tension in the region and urge China towards more democracy. Because
we cannot forget the nature of China’s regime.... It appears that both Europe and France have
forgotten their history.... It was
thanks to American pressure, not European pressure, that China liberated most
of its dissidents. This last point should teach us more modesty when it comes
to speaking about the excellent relations we have with China and the importance
of Europe for China: because for Beijing, the keys to most of its international
problems lie in Washington, not in Paris or in Brussels.”
MIDDLE EAST
UAE:
"Another Troublespot"
The expatriate-oriented English-language Khaleej
Times opined (10/18): "After
North Korea and South Korea, is it the turn of Taiwan to harbour nuclear
ambitions? Earlier this week reports, attributed to IAEA inspectors, talked of
Taiwan having pursued a nuclear weapons programme until mid 1980s.... Naturally, there is alarm in Washington. But if Taiwan has dabbled with nuclear
technology, it should come as no surprise. The tiny nation has been living in
constant fear of being attacked and run over by the mainland China.... The fact that China continues to consider
Taiwan as part of China and from time to time makes its designs on the
‘renegade’ island public does not help the troubled relationship between Beijing
and Taipei. Little wonder then Taiwan, despite being one of the most prosperous
nations in the region and the so-called Asian economic Tiger, feels ever
squeezed and squashed by the giant.
Whatever the reality behind Taipei’s nuclear ambitions, the very fact
that it is thinking in terms of acquiring nuclear arms, should be a source of
concern to the international community. This underscores the dangers of
allowing explosive issues like the China-Taiwan dispute to hang around for far
too long. Taiwan obviously thinks it
cannot depend on the U.S. forever to protect it against the Chinese dragon. The
Taiwan Straits is one of the most dangerous trouble spots of our time. The
world must persuade China and Taiwan to strive for a negotiated settlement of
the issue."
SOUTH ASIA
INDIA:
"Left To Its Own Devices"
An editorial in the centrist Kolkatta-based Telegraph
read (10/18): "The rhetoric had
been getting harsher...as Taiwan's leaders stoked popular fears of Communist
China's intentions in an attempt to push through a controversial Dols. 18
billion arms purchase from the U.S....
China reacted with fury to the suggestion that Taiwan might make a
retaliatory strike against cities on the mainland. The U.S...made virtually no
response to China's threats, but many countries in the region had been warning
Taiwan...that if it got into a shooting war with China, it was on its
own.... When Taiwan and China first
opened direct talks...the Nationalist Party...had no objection to negotiating
on the basis that there might be two rival regimes at the moment, but there was
only 'one China'. The Nationalists had retreated to Taiwan after losing China's
civil war but they were as determined as the Communists that the motherland
must eventually be reunited.... As China's
economy grows, its importance to its trading partners, including the U.S.,
makes them ever more reluctant to confront Beijing over Taiwan, and the Iraq
quagmire makes Washington doubly reluctant to contemplate further military
commitments in East Asia.... The more
level-headed elements in the DPP never really believed that an independent and
internationally recognized Taiwan was a possibility; now they will have to stop
pretending to the voters that it is possible. The best they can hope for is a
prolongation of the status quo until, some day, China becomes a democracy and
reunification becomes a more palatable prospect."
AFRICA
UGANDA: "Taiwan's Cold
Shower"
The state-owned New Vision declared (10/19): "The rhetoric had been getting harsher
for months, as Taiwan’s leaders stoked popular fears of Communist China’s
intentions in an attempt to push through a controversial $18 billion arms purchase
from the U.S. It reached a peak on September
30, when President Chen Sui-bian warned that the People’s Liberation Army now
has 610 ballistic missiles aimed at the island, with the number forecast to 800
by next year--enough to wipe out most of Taiwan’s defences in a few hours. Prime Minister Yu Shyi-kun went further,
calling for Taiwan to develop its own offensive missiles to deter a Communist
attack.... Blood-curdling stuff, even if
none of the warheads on those missiles would be nuclear.... The People’s Republic reacted with fury to
the suggestion that Taiwan might make a retaliatory strike against cities on
the mainland.... The U.S., preoccupied
with Iraq and the elections, made virtually no response to China’s threats, but
various countries in the region had been warning Taiwan for months that if it
got into a shooting war with China, it was on its own.... By late September the message was starting to
get through. The Taiwan defence ministry back-pedalled rapidly on Prime
Minister Yu’s talk of firing missiles at Shanghai, denying any intention of
creating a 'balance of terror' with the mainland. And then, on 10 October,
Taiwan’s National Day, President Chen Shui-bian, went into reverse on all
fronts."
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